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Legislative redistricting is “the nastiest form of politics that there is”
according to Rep. Lynn Westmoreland, the Vice Chairman of the House
Republican Redistricting Committee in 2010.1 Redistricting occurs every
ten years, following the national decennial census and most states,
including Florida, allow their legislatures to reapportion their state
legislative and federal congressional districts. Because of the partisan
nature of the redistricting process, the newly drawn districts will affect, and
can unduly skew, electoral outcomes for the decade to come. In states such
as Florida, where a single party controls both chambers of the state
legislature, redistricting can devolve from a standard practice of partisan
gamesmanship whereby some party equanimity in the redistricting process
can be achieved, to outright gerrymandering on the part of the controlling
party.2
When a single party controls both state legislative chambers, it
provides them virtually unfettered power in the redistricting process,
especially in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Shelby County
v. Holder striking down the preclearance provision of the Voting Rights
Act.3 A party fully in control of the decennial redistricting process now has
carte blanche to take steps to solidify its majority hold on state legislative
chambers and congressional districts for the ensuing decade and can
completely hinder any chance the minority may have of regaining majority
control at the state or federal level.4
This will also often result in
disproportionate representation in the legislative body in comparison to the
political makeup of the state’s body politic. If sustained over time,
gerrymandering can ultimately skew a state’s partisan representation to the
point where one party holds a supermajority in both legislative houses, and
1. Robert Draper, The League of Dangerous Mapmakers, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the-league-of/309084/.
2. See Gerrymandering, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at http://www.
britannica.com/ EBchecked/topic/231865/gerrymandering (explaining that in 1812,
Massachusetts Gov. Eldridge Gerry, signed a bill creating state a senate district distinctly
resembling a salamander to ensure that the state Senate remained in control of the
Democratic Republican Party despite the House and governorship being swept by the
Federalist Party).
3. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (striking down § 4(b) of
the Voting Rights Act).
4. See Sari Horowitz, Justice Department to Challenge States’ Voting Laws, WASH.
POST (July 25, 2013) (“Hours after [the] Supreme Court ruling on voting rights, Texas
Attorney general Greg Abbott said the state would move forward with its voter ID law and
would carry out redistricting changes that had been mired in court battles.”).
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can run roughshod over the minority party regardless of any political or
electoral efforts it may undertake.
Gerrymandering is a nationwide problem that is significantly skewing
the country’s political landscape without even considering the raft of voter
ID laws recently enacted by Republican controlled state legislatures.5 In
the 2012 election cycle, Democrats received 1.4 million more votes in
elections for the House of Representatives, but Republicans maintained
control of the House by 33 seats. States occasionally make efforts to raise
the issue of gerrymandering6 but, regardless of their success or failure,
gerrymandering quickly recedes from the public consciousness and is
quickly replaced in the zeitgeist by memes and images that propagate an
overarching belief that one party is dominant on a state and national scale,
such as that below.7

5. The restrictive voter ID laws passed in North Carolina, Texas, Pennsylvania, etc.,
will not be further discussed herein.
6. See, e.g., FLA. DEPT. OF ELEC., PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS TO BE
VOTED ON NOVEMBER 2, 2010, available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/publications/pdf/
2010/2010ConstitutionalAmendmentsEnglishOMIT379.pdf (highlighting that Amendments
5 & 6 set forth fair districting requirements for state legislative and congressional districts,
discussed infra).
7. See Stephen Wolf, Political Geography Part 5: Mapping the US Congressional
Elections and Comparing to the Presidential, DAILY KOS (Mar. 12, 2013) http://www.
dailykos.com/story/2013/03/12/1191706/-Political-Geography-Part-5-Mapping-the-USCongressional-Elections# (red blocks reflect districts voting for Mitt Romney in the 2012
presidential election).
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These maps are widely distributed on social media and do not take into
account the massive population of registered opposition voters hidden
beneath the red and blue painted counties. Further, as mapping technology
has improved in recent decades, these districts are arranged to appear
compact and reasonable, but in many cases, such as in Florida, Arizona,
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, Virginia,
Wisconsin and Texas, the result create legislatures that are more politically
skewed than ever before.8
The extreme partisan divide of the current political climate extends to
the states where sustained gerrymanders over multiple redistricting periods
can lead to a virtual lockout of the minority party in state legislatures at the
time of reapportionment, even in cases where that minority is supported by
a majority of registered voters in the state. The gerrymander creates
statistical improbabilities such that a minority of voters can actually obtain
a majority of legislative seats. In states such as Florida, it is incongruous
that there are over 500,000 more registered Democrats than Republicans
and the state has voted for Democrats in four of the last six presidential

8. See Sam Wang, Op-Ed., The Great Gerrymander of 2012, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/the-great-gerrymander-of-2012.
html (using statistical tools to find partisan gerrymandering in these ten states).
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elections,9 yet the Republican Party holds a 2-to-1 advantage in
representation within its Congressional Delegation and a virtual
supermajority in both state legislative houses.10 The Republican advantage
in Florida’s state and federal legislative delegations that was entrenched
during the 2002 reapportionment was only strengthened following the 2012
reapportionment despite the continued advantage of registered Democrats.
Until 2004, federal courts would consider whether a purely political
gerrymander violated the Equal Protection clause, but have since deemed
such claims non-justiciable. However, a redistricting pattern reflecting
significantly disproportionate political gerrymandering over a lengthy
period of time, as has occurred in Florida, may belie a blueprint to reviving
purely political gerrymandering as a justiciable question, and it may
provide the courts with guidelines to permit intervention. Although such a
blueprint may be efficacious in other states and despite what could be
considered a systematic pattern of disenfranchisement of Democratic
voters’ preferences in Florida, it is unlikely that the courts would apply
such to Florida due to the simple fact that 22% of all registered voters in
Florida are not affiliated with the major parties (“Non-Party Affiliates” or
“NPAs”).11
The below will focus on the history and standards of the courts’
consideration of purely political gerrymandering and its current status.
Specifically, that despite the creeping invidiousness of gerrymandering, the
courts will no longer consider whether purely political gerrymandering
violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 It will
also discuss the changing political landscape of Florida legislative districts
over the course of the past twenty years, with a specific focus to
9
There may be an argument that Democrats have won, or should have won, Florida
in five of the last six presidential elections, but that is a topic for many other articles.
10. Aaron Deslatte & Kathleen Haughney, Despite Changes, Not Much Different in
the State Legislature, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Nov. 7, 2012), http://articles.orlando
sentinel.com/2012-11-07/news/os-florida-legislative-outcome-20121107_1_gop-agendaflorida-republicans-state-senate-seats (“Despite nearly 500,000 more registered Democrats
than Republicans statewide, Republicans were poised to hold onto 76 of their 81 seats in the
120-member Florida House and lost only two seats in the Senate to keep a 26-14 majority.”).
11. FLA. DEPT. OF ELEC., COUNTY VOTER REGISTRATION BY PARTY ( October 9, 2012),
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-registration/statistics/pdf/2012/GEN2012_County
Party.pdf [hereinafter COUNTY VOTER REGISTRATION 2012].
12. See U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; . . . nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
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redistricting following the 2000 and 2010 censuses and the manner in
which these changes have resulted in a virtual lockout of Democrats from
state politics. It will also synopsize how these changes may be applied to
the strictures providing for judicial action in the case of purely political
gerrymandering as violative of equal protection set forth in Davis v.
Bandemer.13 Finally, it will discuss recent constitutional amendments to
the Florida Constitution to prohibit political considerations in redistricting,
the current lawsuit focusing on their enforcement and how other states have
attempted to bring equanimity to the political process of redistricting.
For the purpose of this discussion, “safe” district means there is greater
than a 53/47% partisan split in voter registration, “leaning” district means
that there is a 51-52.9% partisan advantage between registered party voters,
and “toss-up” means that the partisan split of registered voters lies between
49.1%-50.9%.14 All electoral and voter registration figures have been
derived from the Florida Department of State Division of Elections15, and
does not take into full consideration the population of NPA voters in
Florida.16

13. See Davis v. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 2816 (1986) (holding “political
gerrymandering cases are properly justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause”).
14. See Redistricting and Incumbent Protection in 2001-2002, VOTING AND
DEMOCRACY RESEARCH CENTER, http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=715 (last visited Mar. 3,
2013) (defining a “safe” district as having a 55/45% partisan split, and a “highly
competitive” district as having a 53/47% partisan split. However, after analyzing two
decades of electoral data, in Florida, “safe” districts tend to comport with the definition in
the body of text).
15. Voter Registration Statistics – By Election, FLA. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION
OF ELECTIONS, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-registration/statistics/elections.shtml (last
visited Apr. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Voter Registration Statistics].
16. Compare FLA. DEPT. OF ELEC., COUNTY VOTER REGISTRATION BY PARTY (Oct. 11,
1994),
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-registration/statistics/pdf/1994/94genparty.pdf,
with FLA. DEPT. OF ELEC., COUNTY VOTER REGISTRATION BY PARTY, Oct. 7, 2002, http://
election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-registration/statistics/pdf/2002/2002genparty.pdf, and FLA.
DEPT. OF ELEC., COUNTY VOTER REGISTRATION BY PARTY (Oct. 9, 2012), http://
election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-registration/statistics/pdf/2012/GEN2012_CountyParty.pdf (signifying that Florida NPA voter populace has increased from 8.6% in 1994, to 16.5% in 2002
and to 22% in 2012).
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I. Gerrymandering as a Justiciable Question
A. Davis v. Bandemer & the Era of Justiciability
The modern consideration of gerrymandering arose citing challenges
to voting rights from racial discrimination, first in Baker v. Carr,17 followed
by a litany of cases. 18 The Baker court dealt primarily with the issue of race
related gerrymandering, holding that the “equal protection clause is not
diminished by the fact that the discrimination relates to political rights.”19
Additionally, the Baker court laid out the standard by which an issue
was “justiciable” before the court, or whether it was a purely political
question to which the federal courts could not grant jurisdiction.
Specifically, political questions may have many elements which “identify it
as essentially a function of the separation of powers,” including whether
there is a textual constitutional commitment to a specific political
department, the “lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolution, the “impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination,” the “impossibility of undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government,”
“the unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision” or

17. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187 (1962) (questioning the constitutionality of a
Tennessee apportionment statute on the basis that it led to a debasement of certain citizens’
votes in certain counties).
18. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 119 (1986) (citing Rogers v. Lodge, 458
U.S. 613, 627–28 (1982) (holding that an at-large electoral system maintained for diluting
the African American vote was invalid and ordered use of single member districts)) (stating
that without population deviation, racial gerrymandering presents a justiciable question); see
also Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 80 (1980) (holding that an at-large electoral system did
not violate the African American population’s Fifteenth Amendment rights); White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973) (holding that the establishment of multimember districts
was proper given history of discrimination against minorities); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U.S. 124, 124 (1971) (considering question of multimember district reapportionment’s
affects on the district minority population); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 (1966)
(holding that improperly proportioned multimember districts do not automatically result in
invidious discrimination when election outcome does not substantially differ from “that
which would result from use of a permissible population base”); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S.
433, 436 (1965) (holding that multimember districts did not devalue votes in comparison to
that of single-member district constituents).
19. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209–10 (quoting Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1
(1944)).
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the potential embarrassment from pronouncements by multiple departments
on a single question.20
Over time, and in areas not covered explicitly by the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, claimants brought actions asserting unconstitutional
gerrymandering arising from purely political discrimination as between
Republicans and Democrats. In 1986, the Supreme Court determined for
the first time, in Davis v. Bandemer,21 that gerrymandering was a justiciable
question when the only affected class was a political party itself.22
Bandemer involved claims by the Indiana Democratic Party that the
Republican Party had unconstitutionally gerrymandered the state legislative
districts to disproportionately preclude the Democrats their representational
voice.23 Following the 1981 redistricting overseen by the Republican Party,
Democratic candidates for the Indiana House received a majority of the
statewide votes (51.9%), but won only 43 of 100 seats.24 Additionally, the
Democratic senatorial candidates received 53.1% of the statewide vote, but
received only a bare majority of the seats, 13 of 25.25
In so deeming the question of purely political gerrymandering
justiciable, the Davis court wrote at length, noting that the creation of
districts that would “‘minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or
political elements of the voting population’ would raise a constitutional
question.”26 While mere political gamesmanship did not warrant
overturning redistricting under the Fourteenth Amendment, efforts to dilute
a political party’s voting power warranted review:
Since the achieving of fair and effective representation for all citizens is
concededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment, we conclude that
[T]he Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal
participation by all voters in the election of State legislators. Diluting the
weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic

20. Id. at 217.
21. 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (holding “that political gerrymandering cases are
properly justiciable under the Equal Protection Class”).
22. See id. at 124–27 (stating that “each political group in a state should have the same
chance to elect representatives of it choice as any other political group”).
23. See generally Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
24. Id. at 115.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 119 (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)).
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constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as
invidious discriminations based upon factors such as race....27

The Bandemer court declined to act and overturn the gerrymandered
districts in Indiana despite apparent sympathies to the opponents of political
gerrymandering. The Court noted that redistricting merely makes it more
difficult to for a particular group to prevail is not per se unconstitutional
because there is a perception that even the losing faction will be able to
influence the political process by their simple continued involvement in
engaging the candidates and elected officials.28
In so striking down the Indiana Democrats’ claim of unconstitutional
gerrymandering, the Court notes that there was no finding by the lower
court as to whether the Democrats could retake either legislative body,
whether they would be resigned to a minority status for the entire decade, or
whether they would fair better following reapportionment subsequent to the
1990 census.29 The Bandemer court analogized the Democrats’ losses in
Indiana to Whitcomb v. Chavis,30 stating that the “failure to have legislative
seats in proportion to its populations emerges more as a function of losing
elections than of built-in bias” and that “canceled out” votes are a
euphemism for political defeat.31 “Only when such placement affects
election results and political power statewide has an actual disadvantage
occurred.”32 They essentially held that as this was the first election
following the redistricting, it was possible that Democrats could retake the
legislature, and a wait and see approach was more appropriate than
involving the judiciary in every potential case of political gerrymandering.
Unfortunately, the Court did not provide clear guidance as to the
required findings allowing courts to intervene when purely political
gerrymandering is found to purposefully disenfranchise an entire party from
involvement in a state’s political activity. In holding that a claim against
political gerrymandering could succeed only in the event that “intentional
27. Id. at 123–24 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565–66 (1964)).
28. Id. at 131–32 (“[T]he mere fact that a particular apportionment scheme makes it
more difficult for a particular group in a particular district to elect the representatives of its
choice does not render that scheme constitutionally infirm.”).
29. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 135–36 (1986) (stating the findings of the
District Court).
30. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160 (holding that an apportionment
scheme did not comply with the requirements of the equal protection clause).
31. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 137.
32. Id. at 141.
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discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual
discriminatory effect on that group,” the plurality did not go so far as to lay
out a specific framework to guide the courts as to when intervention is
appropriate.33 As a result, a number of cases of purely political
gerrymandering were reviewed as justiciable, but no action was taken.34
B. Vieth v. Jubelirer & Regression to Nonjusticiability
In 2004, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of purely
political gerrymandering in Vieth v. Jubelirer,35 which wholly overturned
Bandemer, declaring the question nonjusticiable.36 Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia stated that the effects prong of Bandemer would be
very difficult to meet because it would have to take into account “a variety
of historic factors and projected election results, [that] the [effected] group
had been ‘denied its chance to effectively influence the political process’ as
a whole, which could be achieved even without electing a candidate.”37 In
so reasoning, Justice Scalia relies on the Bandemer provision that in a
statewide challenge to redistricting, the “inquiry centers on the voters’
direct or indirect influence on the elections of the state legislature as a
whole.”38
The Court also reasoned that equal protection under the Constitution
does not guarantee equal representation in government to equivalently sized
groups.39 While the dissenting justices set forth several theorems whereby
33. See id. at 127.
34. See Duckworth v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 322 F.3d 769, 774 (4th Cir.
2003) (stating that strangely shaped districts are, alone, not sufficient to show
unconstitutional gerrymandering absent actual discriminatory effects on an identifiable
group); see also Smith v. Boyle, 144 F.3d 1060, 1068 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that the denial
of equal protection must be shown to be intentional to warrant intervention); LaPorte Cnty.
Republican Cent. Comm. v. Bd .of Com’rs of Cnty. of LaPorte, 43 F.3d 1126, 1128 (7th
Cir. 1994) (redistricting for at-large county commission seats is not actionable without
showing affected balance between political parties); O’Lear v. Miller, 222 F. Supp. 2d 850
(E.D. Mich. 2002) (using the analysis in Davis v. Bandemer to assess plaintiff’s equal
protection claim); Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 1022
(D. Md. 1994) (holding that state’s motion for summary judgment is granted because
plaintiffs failed to satisfy the two-part test outlined in Davis v. Bandemer).
35. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
36. Id. at 306.
37. Id. at 283 (quoting Bandemer, 478 U.S 109, 132 (1986)).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 287.
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the courts could deem political gerrymandering unconstitutional, including
Justices Breyer’s definition that such occurred via “the unjustified use of
political factors to entrench a minority in power,” the majority rejected all
such reasoning as too inexact to adequately delineate guidance for finding
actionable scenarios.40 Ultimately, the reversal of Bandemer was based
upon the Court’s assertion that it was unworkable and the courts are
incapable of principled application of its strictures.41
However, Justice Kennedy held out hope that political gerrymandering
may again be a justiciable question. Justice Kennedy concurred with the
outcome in Veith based on the facts before the court, but he made an effort
to note that a purely political gerrymander will violate equal protection
upon a “conclusion that the classifications [utilized], though generally
permissible, were applied in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to
any legitimate legislative objective” as legislative redistricting should
establish “fair and effective representation for all citizens.”42 While a
“manageable standard” to deal with illegitimate partisan gerrymandering
had not yet been found, that does not preclude the possibility that such a
standard will come to light.43
II. The Odd Case of Gerrymandering in Florida
“Fair and effective representation for all citizens” is a just and valid
goal, although not one that is often sought by either major party. It is in the
self-interests of political parties and politicians to maintain power once a
majority is achieved or a seat is won. In its traditional sense, Gerrymandering will often simply reinforce and institutionalize majority power,
40. Id. at 292–305 (Stevens, J dissenting) (reasoning that political gerrymandering be
subject to strict scrutiny as suppression of political speech under the First Amendment is not
discernable in the Constitution; Justice Souter’s five part test showing that the plaintiff is the
member of a cohesive political group, that no heed was paid to traditional districting
principles, there were specific deviations from traditional districting principles and the
distribution of the group’s population, that a hypothetical district exists remedying packing
and cracking, and there was intentional manipulation of the district to pack and crack the
group does not work, because Justice Souter does not elucidate what is being tested for;
Justice Breyer’s unjust entrenchment of the minority is too nebulous, and he gives no
instance of permanent frustration of the majority’s will, and; Justice Kennedy’s wait and see
approach has already failed).
41. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305–06 (2004).
42. Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 311.
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which likewise often reflects a majority of the population (or one that is
nearly evenly split by political alliance).
In that regard, however, Florida poses a somewhat unique situation.
Florida is a “swing state” on the national level but the makeup of its
legislature and congressional delegation do not remotely reflect the political
alliances held by its populace. As of the 2012 general election, Florida had
500,000 more registered Democrats than Republicans, forty-one of sixtyseven counties had more registered Democrats than Republicans,44 the
Republican governor, who won by a 1.2% margin, had a 39% approval
rating,45 the voters again cast a majority of ballots for President Obama, and
yet Republicans held 17 of 27 congressional seats,46 26 of 40 state Senate
seats,47 and 76 of 120 state House seats.48

44. COUNTY VOTER REGISTRATION 2012, supra note 10 (including nearly all of the
most populous counties, Broward, Palm Beach, Miami-Dade, Duval, Orange, Pinellas,
Hillsborough, Polk and Volusia. Seminole, Lee, Pasco & Sarasota Counties maintain
Republican majorities).
45. Jeremy Wallace, Is Romney Campaign Avoiding Rick Scott?, SARASOTA HERALD
TRIB., Nov. 2, 2012.
46. Members of the H.R., FLA. H.R. J. (1991); Members of the S., FLA. S. J., (1991).
47. 2012–2014 Senators, THE FLA. S., http://www.flsenate.gov/Senators/ (last visited
Apr. 10, 2013).
48. Representatives for Regular Session 2013, FLA. H.R., http://www.myflorida
house.gov/ sections/representatives/representatives.aspx?SessionId=73 (last visited Apr. 10,
2013).
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A. The 1990s
During the 1990 census, Democrats held a solid majority in the House
and a small majority in the Senate, allowing them to control the
redistricting process.49 There is limited electronically available information
pertaining to the voter registration statistics available for Florida pre-1994,
however it does not appear that the Democrats took significant or effective
efforts to increase their majorities via redistricting as following the 1992
elections there was no change in the membership makeup of the House, in
which they held a seventy-four-seat majority, and they actually lost a seat in
the Senate.50 Additionally, while Florida gained four Congressional seats,
only a single additional seat went to Democrats in the 1992 election.51
Moreover, there were no challenges to the 1992-redistricting plan asserting

49. See Members of the H.R., FLA. H.R. J. (1992) (House: 74-46); Members of the S.,
FLA S. J. (1992) (Senate: 22-18).
50. See Members of the H.R., FLA. H.R. J. (1994); Members of the S., FLA. S. J.,
(1994).
51. See Dango, The 1991–1992 redistricting cycle, RED RACING HORSES (Oct. 21,
2011, 10:00:51 PM), http://www.redracinghorses.com/diary/1250/the-19911992-redistricting-cycle.
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that there was impermissible, purely political gerrymandering. Rather, the
challenges to the 1992-plan regarded alleged racial gerrymandering.52
The 1994 election cycle was an odd year in electoral politics with the
Newt Gingrich led Republicans running on the Contract with America. The
Republican Party as a whole placed unprecedented pressure on “Southern”
and “Blue Dog” Democrats, those with traditionally conservative leanings
in somewhat conservative districts to retire, switch parties or face a strong
Republican challenge.53 Many congressional Democrats either retired or
switched parties, which was felt down ticket as well, especially in North
Florida and the Panhandle, which are traditionally more conservative than
the metropolitan regions and areas south of Orlando.54
Following the 1994 elections, there was a drop off in Democrats
represented in the Florida legislature, with a low-point membership in the
House of 45 seats, and in the Senate of 15 seats during the 1990 census
However, other national political events likely depressed
cycle.55
Democratic voters and/or rallied Republicans, such as the Monica
Lewinsky scandal being in the media forefront leading up to the 1998midterm elections. However, during this decade, Democrats only lost a total
of 8 “safe” state House seats and 3 “safe” Senate seats.56
Throughout the 1990s, the districts that were considered “safe” for
each party were fairly stable as to their partisan makeup. In the “safe”
Democratic House districts, on average and between the two major parties,
there was a 66/34% split between Democratic and Republican voters
respectively; whereas in the Republican “safe” districts, there was a 61/39%
split between Republican and Democrats. Similarly, in the “safe”
Democratic Senate districts there was a 66/34% split between registered
52. See Lawyer v. Dep’t. of Justice, 521 U.S. 567 (1997); De Grandy v.
Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Fla. 1992); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997
(1994); Johnson v. Smith, No. TCA 94-40025-WS, 1994 WL 907596 (N.D. Fla. July 18,
1994); Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F. Supp. 1529 (N.D. Fla. 1995); Johnson v. Mortham, 926
F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Fla. 1996); Johnson v. Mortham, No. TCA 94-40025-MMP, 1996 WL
297280 (N.D. Fla. May 31, 1996); Fouts v. Harris, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1351 (S.D. Fla. 1999),
aff’d sub nom. Chandler v. Harris, 529 U.S. 1084 (2000).
53. See Bruce Bartlett, The Dismal Future of the GOP, FORBES.COM, May 1, 2009,
http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/30/specter-future-gop-opinions-columnists-bartlett.html
(last visited Apr. 3, 2013).
54. See id.
55. See Members of the H.R., FLA. H.R. J. (2000); Members of the S., FLA. S. J. (2000).
56. The 2000 Democrats had 53 “safe” House districts and 45 seats, 18 “safe” Senate
districts and 15 seats.
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Democrats and Republicans. In the “safe” Republican districts, the split
was 59/41%.57
Following the 2002 reapportionment, there were slight but significant
changes to the House district partisan splits and a larger change to the
Senate districts, both of which appear to have had dramatic results
effectively ensconcing the Republican Party’s power in Florida for the
entirety of the 2000s and seemingly beyond.58

57. See Voter Registration Statistics, supra note 15.
58. See Sasha Abramsky, The Redistricting Wars, THE NATION (Dec. 11, 2003),
http://archive.fairvote.org/redistricting/reports/remanual/frames.htm (explaining that, “entirely due to redistricting,” the Republicans expanded their majority).
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B. The 2000s and the Challenge to Purely Political Gerrymandering
As of the 2000 decennial census, the Republican Party had control of
both houses of the Florida Legislature by margins of 75 to 45 and 25 to 15
in the House and Senate respectively placing them wholly in control of the
redistricting process.59 During the 1992 redistricting process, Republicans
59.

See Matthew C. Isbell, Florida Senate: Republican Gerrymander tilts odds, but
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claimed that Democrats locked the doors to the reapportionment suite in the
Capitol Building, and Speaker of the House, Daniel Webster asserted that
the 2002 process would be open to all.60 However, Speaker Webster’s
statement was made shortly before a security keypad was installed in the
same office suite, and Democrats were not provided the entry code.61
Following the 2000 reapportionment, the Democrats immediately filed
suit alleging racial gerrymandering and a breach of equal protection for
purely political gerrymandering in Bush v. Martinez.62 A three-judge panel
in the Federal Southern District of Florida heard the challenge and, as in
numerous other challenges to voter dilution through political Gerrymandering, nothing ultimately came of it.
The court considered Bandemer but required that a four-part test not
set forth therein be met to succeed on a claim of political gerrymandering:
1) the group is sufficiently large and geographically compact enough to
constitute the majority of a single member district; 2) the group is
politically cohesive; 3) the party winning the contested seat votes
sufficiently as a block to enable it, “in absence of special circumstances,
such as the minority candidate running unopposed, to defeat the minority
party’s preferred candidate”; and, 4) once the first three factors are meet,
that the totality of the circumstances reflects vote dilution.63 Interestingly,
the court did not take into account the population of NPA voters in Florida.
The Martinez court noted that in political gerrymandering cases, the
best evidence of political identity will be proof of bloc voting and political
cohesiveness.64 These will most easily be established by showing that the
candidates supported by each group are separate, and that each group votes

Chances for DemocraticTakeover within Grasp, MCI MAPS, (July 18, 2013),
http://mcimaps.com/florida-senate-republican-gerrymander-tilts-odds-but-chances-fordemocratic-takeover-within-grasp/ (“The end result was Democrats losing control of both
legislative chambers in the 1990s. Redistricting following the 2000 Census allowed
Republicans to further gerrymander themselves into a secure majority.”).
60. David Royse, Redistricting is a Handy Political Tool, ASSOC. PRESS (Mar. 25,
2001), http://archive.fairvote.org/redistricting/reports/remanual/flnews2.htm#handy.
61. Steve Bousquet, Democrats Fret Over Capitol Office Politics, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES (Nov. 27, 2001), available at http://www.sptimes.com/News/112701/State/Democrats
_fret_over_C.shtml.
62. 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
63. Id. at 1334–35 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986) (citing
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011–12 (1994))).
64. See id. at 1336.
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for their candidate with a general mutual exclusivity, which must be shown
over the course of time, not just a single election.65
The Democrats were likely hasty in bringing the pure political
gerrymandering claim in the Martinez action as only a single election had
occurred under the new reapportionment, as occurred in Bandemer.66 A
lengthier record could have better reflected the Democrat’s claims in the
light that they were relegated to essentially become a superminority party
throughout the decade. Certainly, there were issues of underperformance,
but the political gerrymander helped preclude the Democratic Party from
even the possibility of winning a majority of seats in either state house or of
obtaining a majority of the congressional delegation.
1. Results of the 2002 Reapportionment
Under the 2002 reapportionment plan, the Democrats were not
completely shut out of the political process vis-à-vis having no Democratic
members of the state legislature, but their chances at reestablishing a
majority in either house were diminished by packing more registered
Democrats into fewer districts, diluting their vote in surrounding districts
and thusly creating a statistical improbability that they will be able to
successfully contest Republican held districts or achieve a Democratic
majority in either chamber of the Florida Legislature. Democrats were
additionally discounted from the Congressional Delegation.67
The 2002 reapportionment reduced Democratic “safe” districts from
53 to 46, Democratic leaning districts were reduced from 7 to 3, and there
was no change in “toss-up” districts, remaining at 9. Alternatively,
Republican “safe” districts rose from 43 to 51 and “leaning” districts rose
from 8 to 11. This plan resulted in a 22-seat swing in the Republican
Party’s favor by voter registration.

65.
66.
67.

See id.
See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 135–36 (1986).
See Voter Registration Statistics, supra note 15.
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Likewise, in the Senate, Democrats lost 3 traditionally safe seats,
falling from 18 to 15 seats, while Republicans picked up 2, moving from 16
to 18 seats. Thus, there was a 5-seat swing.
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For the Congressional Delegation, Florida was granted 2 additional
seats, which were swiftly apportioned into “safe” Republican districts,
while the Democrats lost a “safe” district, leaving them with a total of 8
“safe” districts.
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While there are issues with Democratic electoral underperformance in
the late 1990s, the 2002 reapportionment plan essentially codified a
Republican majority, again despite registered Democrats composing a
majority of the electorate.68 Following the implementation of the 2000
redistricting plan, to obtain a bare majority in the House, Democrats would
have had to sweep all districts with even the smallest Democratic majority,
as well as all of the “toss-up” districts and steal three Republican districts.
To regain the Senate, the same would apply in sweeping all of the “toss-up”
seats. To gain a majority in the Congressional Delegation, Democrats
would have to take their districts, the single “toss-up” district, the 2
Republican “leaning” districts, and a “safe” Republican district, which is
statistically unlikely as in any given year as this requires a landslide victory
68. See generally Barbara Giles, Florida Congressional Elections, 1952–2002: A
Reversal of Party Fortunes, 32 POL. & POL’Y 434 (Nov. 12, 2004), available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2004.tb00191.x/asset/j.17471346.2004.tb00191.x.pdf?v=1&t=hn7neivg&s=6ef0b5bea7675541b853aa75b76fc2def3c2b6
37 (examining elections from 1952-2002 and explaining the significance of reapportionment
elections in bringing about change in party fortunes).
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among NPA voters. Additionally there are generally only 60 state House
races and 10–12 Senate races in a given year because incumbency
protection makes running in most districts a waste of time and money.
2. Packing and Cracking Democratic Districts
Gerrymandering is expected to give an advantage to the party
controlling the redistricting process. However, it is the invidious packing
and cracking schemes, increasing the density of the opposition party in
already controlled districts while diluting their numbers in other districts
that is at the heart of gerrymandering. This enables the gerrymandering
party to strengthen its control of the legislature on one hand and allow them
to announce that they established and/or protected number of safe
opposition districts on the other. The packing and cracking of Democratic
districts and the strengthening of Republican districts becomes patently
clear when examined following the 2002 reapportionment. To this end, the
“safe” Democratic districts saw an increase in the partisan divide, while the
Republicans saw a decrease in such while maintaining the “safe” threshold
of having over 55% of the registered partisan voters in the district.
The alterations to the Florida House districts were small, but
significant. Prior to 2002, the average partisan split in “safe” Democratic
House districts was 66.9/33.1%. The post-2002 reapportionment saw a
2.5% increase in the partisan divide of safe districts to 69.4/30.6%, which
diluted the power of Democrats in neighboring districts, some of which
were “leaning” or “toss-ups.” Conversely, Republican “safe” districts saw a
diminution in the partisan split from 60.7/ 39.3% to 59/41% after the
reapportionment, which ensured that “safe” seats remained safe and
bolstered neighboring districts that were “leaning” or “toss-ups.”
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The 2002 election cycle also saw the second fewest state House races
of the 2000s, at 46, as well as the fewest “competitive” races in two decades
with only 3 races that fell under that category as having a 53/47% partisan
split.69

69. See VOTING AND DEMOCRACY RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 13 (noting that
“competitive” races have final election results falling within a 55/45% split. For the
purposes here, a “competitive” race falls within a 53/47% split).; see also Bandemer, 478
U.S. at 130.

THE RECENT HISTORY OF GERRYMANDERING IN FLORIDA

319

Florida State House Election Results
60
50
40

Dem. Safe
Win

30

Rep. Safe
Win

20

Close Races
(47-53%)

10
0

The same pattern was seen in the Senate in 2002 with the average
partisan divide of Democratic voters rising fully 3%, from a 66.2/33.8%
split to a 69.2/30.8% split in “safe” districts. The Republican “safe” district
fell from a 59.4/40.6% split to a 58.5/41.5% split, almost 1%.
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This pattern held true to the Congressional districts as well. The
Democrats saw an increase in their average partisan split margins in “safe”
districts of 2.3%, from a 67.5/32.5% split to 69.8/30.2% split. The
Republican reapportionment again maintained their safe margins while
bolstering “leaning” and “toss-up” districts, going so far as to turn some
Democratic “leaning” districts into “safe” Republican districts. The most
obvious occurrence was in the grouping of Districts 20-22, which had
respective Democrat-to-Republican splits in 2000 of 59/41, 36/64 and
53/47. Following the 2002 reapportionment, the partisan splits of Districts
20-22 were 63/37, 42/58 and 45/55, respectively. By packing a greater
percentage of Democrats into Districts 20 and 21, the newly created district
map was able to alter District 22 from “safe” Democrat to “safe”
Republican district.
80.0%

Partisan Advantage in Safe Congresional Districts
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Absent extraordinary circumstances, reapportionment can place a
stranglehold on the partisan makeup of a state legislature and its
congressional delegation. At times, even extraordinary circumstances can
be placed in check by a well-managed gerrymander. It is telling that only

THE RECENT HISTORY OF GERRYMANDERING IN FLORIDA

321

three Florida congressional seats switched parties during the decade, one of
which was the result of a sex scandal involving underage House pages, and
all three reverted to Republican control in 2010 with the rise of the Tea
Party.70
C. The 2012 Reapportionment and Amendments to Florida’s Constitution
Following the 2010 census, Florida gained an additional two seats to
its congressional delegation, raising the total to 27. In the same year,
recognizing the importance of maintaining equitability in the voting
process, Floridians resoundingly passed two constitutional amendments by
ballot initiative addressing reapportionment and gerrymandering.71 The
purpose of the amendments was to prevent further gerrymandering by
precluding the legislature from reapportioning the districts with the intent to
protect incumbents, and requiring that the new districts be compact and use
existing political boundaries.72 The amendments preclude the legislature
70. Districts 8, 16 and 22 were briefly held by Democrats during the decade. District
8 generally “leaned” Republican and is now a “safe” Republican district with a 56.7/43.3%.
District 16 fell from “safe” to “leaning” Republican following the Mark Foley scandal and
has again been reestablished as a “safe” Republican district with a 57.8/42.2% split. District
22 has since been reapportioned to a “safe” Democratic district.
71. Both proposed amendments were passed with over 62% of the vote. See
Constitutional Amendments, FLA. DEP’T. OF STATE DIV. OF ELEC. Official Results,
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/initiativelist.asp?year=2010&initstatus=ALL&Made
Ballot=Y&ElecType=GEN; see also Standards for Legislature to Follow in Legislative
Redistricting, FLA. DEP’T. OF STATE DIV. OF ELEC., http://election.dos.state.fl.us
/initiatives/initdetail.asp?account=43605&seqnum=2 (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
72. FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 20–21 (2010):
SECTION 20. Standards for establishing congressional district
boundaries.
In establishing congressional district boundaries: (a) No
apportionment plan or individual district shall be drawn with the
intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; and
districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or
abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to
participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect
representatives of their choice; and districts shall consist of
contiguous territory. (b) Unless compliance with the standards in
this subsection conflicts with the standards in subsection (a) or with
federal law, districts shall be as nearly equal in population as is
practicable; districts shall be compact; and districts shall, where
feasible, utilize existing political and geographical boundaries. (c)
The order in which the standards within subsections (a) and (b) of
this section are set forth shall not be read to establish any priority of
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from taking into account political considerations or consulting with political
entities in furtherance of the redistricting procedure.
It is yet to be wholly seen whether the amendments will result in a
significant shake-up of the representational ratios in the Florida Legislature
and Congressional Delegation. However, based on the outcomes of the
2012 election, as it stands, the amendments did not result in any significant
shake-up to Florida’s legislative or congressional delegation ratios. During
the general election, President Obama did not fair as well as in 2008, but he
carried Florida by 84,000 votes. While Democrats gained 2 down ticket
Congressional seats, bringing their total to ten of twenty-seven seats, they
held only 37% of the available seats despite receiving 48% of the votes
statewide.
In order to obtain a majority of the Florida Congressional Delegation,
Democrats would need to steal two Republican-leaning seats, which would
be incredibly difficult to do, needing to overcome an average 46,000-voter
deficit by registration, as well as win landslides among NPA voters.
Alternatively, the Democrats have been packed into districts where they
hold an average advantage in voter registration on Republicans of 114,000
voters. The “safe” Democratic districts essentially cannot be won by a
Republican candidate, but this is preferred by the controlling party under
the gerrymandered scheme to prevent the possibility of Democrats taking
seats elsewhere. The gerrymander continues to be clearly evidenced via the
one standard over the other within that subsection.
SECTION 21. Standards for establishing legislative district
boundaries.
In establishing legislative district boundaries: (a) No apportionment
plan or district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a
political party or an incumbent; and districts shall not be drawn with the
intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or
language minorities to participate in the political process or to diminish
their ability to elect representatives of their choice; and districts shall
consist of contiguous territory. (b) Unless compliance with the
standards in this subsection conflicts with the standards in subsection (a)
or with federal law, districts shall be as nearly equal in population as is
practicable; districts shall be compact; and districts shall, where feasible,
utilize existing political and geographical boundaries. (c) The order in
which the standards within subsections (a) and (b) of this section are set
forth shall not be read to establish any priority of one standard over the
other within that subsection.
Id.
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partisan split in “safe” districts whereby Democrats hold a 68.6/31.4%
margin, while Republicans hold a 56.7/43.3% margin, which is generally
sufficient to hold off even legitimate challenges to the seat.
In reapportioning the state House districts, Democrats gained only 3
“safe” seats, but lost 2 districts that “lean” Democrat by voter registration
tally. The 2012 election results prove the further discouraging effects of
gerrymandering when Democrats won only 23 of 47 races for the House
when receiving 120,000 more votes than Republicans in contested races
and a total of 52% of the popular vote. Additionally, only 13 races fell into
the “competitive” category of less than a 53/47% partisan split. However,
despite their strong showing at the polls, Democrats gained just 5 seats on
their previous total, improving to 44 seats, holding just 36.6% of available
House seats.
In the state Senate plan, Democrats actually lost a “safe” district,
Republicans gained a “leaning” district, and a single additional district fell
into the “toss-up” column. The breakdown for seat safety in the Senate
keeps the Democrats at a disadvantage, giving them 14 “safe” seats and 1
“leaning” seat, while the Republicans have 15 “safe” seats and 5 “leaning”
seats. The Democrats would need to sweep all 5 “toss-up” seats over the
course of two election cycles to simply reach an even split in the state
Senate. In winning 2 seats during the 2012 election, the Democrats brought
their total up to 14 seats.
As to the Congressional Delegation, Democrats gained no “safe”
districts, remaining stable at 9 seats and there were no changes to the “tossup” districts. However, the Republican hold strengthened as the two new
seats granted to the Florida congressional delegation were drawn as safe
Republican districts. Overall, the Republican reapportionment resulted in
12 safe districts, up from 7 in 2010, and a decrease in leaning districts from
5 to 3.
With regard to alterations in the partisan splits following the 2012
reapportionment, there was little change to the Congressional districts. In
the Florida House, however, Democratic votes in “leaning” and “toss-up”
districts were further diluted, with the partisan split in “safe” districts rising
from an average of 69.4/30.6% to 70.4/29.6%. In the Senate, the
Republicans further strengthened their hold on “safe” and “leaning”
districts by decreasing their density in “safe” districts from a decade
average of 58.5/41.5% to 57.8/42.2%, ensuring to remain above the 55%
percent “safe” threshold.
As a result of the redistricting plan passed by the Republican
controlled Florida legislature, two primary lawsuits, which have been
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consolidated for interlocutory appellate purposes, have been filed, alleging
violations of the amendments, and they are currently pending before the
Second Judicial Circuit of Florida in Leon County and the Supreme Court
of Florida.73 The allegations assert that high-ranking staff of the Florida
House Speaker and Senate President were in frequent contact with
Republican Party of Florida officials and consultants who were involved in
analyzing and drafting the 2012 redistricting maps.74 The case is discussed
further below.
III. Applying the Dilution of Democrats’ Voting Power in Florida to
Bandemer
Bandemer was effectively killed by Vieth, but its premise remains: that
purely political gerrymandering results in equal protection violations when
it is shown that a political group is intentionally discriminated against and
there is an actual discriminatory effect. Florida’s reapportionment plans
and their effects over the course of the past two decades provide a blueprint
for the required elements for a court to consider when acting on a claim that
equal protection rights were violated due to purely political
gerrymandering.
The following several factors are those that may be considered in
applying the template and requiring that a court take action to ensure that
equal protection is applied in the face of a purely political gerrymander:
•

Whether the newly reapportioned districts are compact and
contiguous, utilizing historical political boundaries where
possible;

•

Whether the reapportionment is controlled by a single party;

•

Whether that reapportionment significantly weakens the
political prospects of the party in the minority to elect their
representatives to Congress or the state legislature;

73. See The League of Women Voters, et al. v. The Fla. House of Representatives, et
al., Fla. S. Ct. Case No. SC 13-949, (Fla. 1st DCA Case No. 1D12-5280, Fla. 2d Jud. Cir.
Case No. 37-2012 CA 00412); see also Romo, et al. v. The Florida House of
Representatives, et al., Fla. S. Ct. Case No. SC 13-951, (Fla. 1st DCA Case No. 1D12-5280,
Fla. 2d Jud. Cir. Case No. 37-2012 CA 00490).
74. Mary Ellen Klas, Emails Show Legislative Staff Talked with Party Over
Redistricting Maps, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.com/
2013/02/04/v-fullstory/3217223/emails-show-legislative-staff.html.
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•

Whether the party discriminated against has a majority or
minority of the registered voters in that state affected;

•

Whether an extraordinary political circumstance (the Contract
with America, the Obama campaign, the Tea Party Revolution,
etc.) occurred during the decade being reviewed that benefited
the party on the national level, but failed to reflect any benefit
at the state level via an increase in legislative seats, and;

•

Whether the majority party’s membership in the state’s
congressional delegation significantly outstrips its percentage
of registered voters on the state level, i.e., whether a party
holds a supermajority or near supermajority in one or both
legislative chambers despite its registered voters composing
50% or less of the electoral populace.
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A finding that several of the above factors are met would warrant court
intervention and require redistricting with an eye toward equanimity
between the parties’ registered voters in a majority of districts, allowing
both parties an equal opportunity to convince the electorate and NPAs of
their superior position.
These issues are discussed below in combination to reflect the
discriminatory effects on the electoral realities and prospects of the
Democratic Party as affected, the Democrats inability to overcome the
gerrymander despite the extraordinary national surge of the Democratic
Party from 2006-2008, and the effectual extinguishment of Democratic
political influence in the state due to their relegation to superminority
status.
A. Discriminatory Effects
The intentional discrimination against a political group is patently
clear, as the intent of redistricting is to obtain a political advantage in the
electoral process.75 Therefore, the question falls to whether there was a
discriminatory effect.
From 2000 onward, the Republican Party of Florida has solidified its
hold on the Legislature and Congressional Delegation by systematically
packing and cracking Democratic voters into fewer viable districts via the
75. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 128–29 (1986) (“[W]henever a legislature
redistricts, those responsible for the legislation will know . . . whether a particular district is
a safe one for a Democrat or Republican candidate . . . . [I]t should not be very difficult to
prove that the likely political consequences of reapportionment were intended.”).
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2002 and 2012 reapportionment plans.76 Democrats are almost an
afterthought within the legislature because they have been relegated to
superminority status with little hope of regaining any semblance of a
majority in either house.
The system put in place in 2002 creates strong protections for
incumbents and parties. The best predictor of the party that will win a
district is whether that party holds even a bare majority in registered voters
under the 2002 reapportionment system. As seen, supra, only three Florida
congressional seats switched parties during the 2000s. But even more
telling of the strength of the gerrymander is that there were only 79 of a
possible 125 challenges made for a congressional seat during the decade,
and of those races, the party with a minority of registered voters won
election in only 11 contests totaling 14%.
A similar pattern holds true for the Florida Senate and House. In the
Senate, there were only 60 contested races of a possible 100, and the winner
from a district representing a minority of its registered voters only occurred
on 7 occasions or 12% of the time. In fact, in the 2012 Senate elections, the
party with the majority of registered voters in a district held sway in 100%
of the elections. The House saw less than 50% of possible races contested;
there were a mere 242 contests out of a possible 600 over the course of the
decade. In those races, the winner came from the party with a minority of
registered voters in the district in 43 elections or 18% of the time. Of these
races with a minority party winner, the same generally occurred when the
district “leaned” or was a “toss-up,” happening 7 of 11 times in “lean/tossup” congressional races, 5 of 7 times in “lean/toss-up” state Senate races,
and 27 of 60 times in “lean/toss-up” state House races.
Given the data seen in Florida during the past decade, gerrymandering
has clearly resulted in a discriminatory effect on the Democratic Party.
Florida’s electoral districts have virtually been locked down to the party
holding the majority of registered voters in each district, resulting in the
infeasibility that Democrats could obtain a majority in the Congressional
Delegation or either chamber of the Florida Legislature. This trend has
only continued into the 2010s via the 2012 reapportionment, again

76. See John Kennedy, Florida’s Redistricting Could Pit Republicans Against Fellow
Republicans, PALM BEACH POST (Aug. 7, 2011, 10:50PM), http://www.palmbeach
post.com/news/news/state-regional/floridas-redistricting-could-pit-republicans-again/nLwnt/
(noting that after the 2002 redistricting, Republicans held 19 of Florida’s 25 congressional
districts despite Democrats holding a 600,000-voter edge statewide over Republicans).
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controlled by the Republican Party, regardless of the state constitutional
amendments attempting to take politics out of the redistricting equation.
B. The Extraordinary Circumstances of 2008
The Bandemer court declined to act on the Indiana Democrats’ claims
of Equal Protection Clause violations in part by questioning whether it was
possible that they could retake either legislative chamber, whether they
were resigned to minority status for a decade, and whether they would fare
better following the 1990 decennial census.77 In applying those inquiries to
the Florida scenario, the answer is no to all three.
As discussed, supra, there can be extraordinary circumstances that can
catapult one political party over the other to obtain a surprise majority in a
single election cycle as occurred in 1994 with the Contract with America.
The Democrats “extraordinary circumstance” occurred in 2008 behind a
confluence of events: President Obama’s campaign, President Bush’s
incredibly low 37% approval rating,78 and the emerging fiscal crisis.
Nationally, Democrats gained 21 congressional House seats, expanding
their majority to a 257-178 margin.79 There was an 8-seat gain in the
United States Senate, raising the Democratic majority (including the two
Independents) to a 57-43 margin.80 Finally, Barack Obama won the
presidency with 365 Electoral College votes and by a margin of 10 million
popular votes.81
The national trend did not, however, apply to Florida, which President
Obama carried by almost 250,000 votes.82 There were 23 Congressional
77. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 135–36 (determining that the District Court erred in
concluding there was a violation of equal protection in the absence of explicit findings that
Democrats could not retake either legislative chamber, were resigned to minority status, and
would have no hope of doing better following the 1990 census).
78. George W. Bush Presidential Job Approval, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/
poll/116500/presidential-approval-ratings-george-bush.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).
79. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2008: ELECTION RESULTS
FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE, AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 3
(July 2009), available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federalelections2008.shtml
[hereinafter FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2008].
80. Id.
81. Id. at 5, 13.
82. FLA. DEP’T OF STATE DIV. OF ELECTIONS, OFFICIAL RESULTS: PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, available at http://doe.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?Ele
ctionDate=11/4/2008&DATAMODE= (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).
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races for 25 available seats and Democrats gained 1 seat, winning 2
Republican “leaning” seats and losing 1 “safe” seat.83 Although the final
total vote tally reflects a 300,000-voter preference for Republicans, the 2
districts where the incumbent was not contested were Democratic
strongholds with a combined 500,000 registered Democrats to 110,000
registered Republicans, which likely would have erased any Republican
advantage in that vote total.84 Thus, were a majority of votes for Florida’s
Congressional Delegation to fall for the Democrats or were there a 50/50
split, the Delegation total would not have changed, and Republicans would
still hold a 15 to 10 seat advantage over Democrats, which is demonstrable
evidence of gerrymandering.
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In the Florida House, again, Democrats only gained 4 seats in races for
only 56 of 120 available seats.85 Of those 56 races, 33 of the seats
historically are or were “safe” for Republicans and an additional 6 seats
historically leaned Republican. Democrats likely underperformed in the
state House races as they lost 12 of 15 races where there was a majority
party switch of registered voters, with the winning candidate coming from
83. FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2008, supra note 79, at 97–100.
84. Id.
85. Candidate Listing for 2008 General Election, Fla. Dep’t of State, Div. of
Elections, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/candidate/CanList.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
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the minority of a district. However, in all of those races, the Democratic
candidate was facing a Republican incumbent, and incumbents are
notoriously difficult to defeat due to the ingrained name recognition and
fund raising capabilities.86 Regardless, Democrats were successful in
carrying just 14 of the 56 races, bringing their total membership in the
House to 39.87 To have obtained a majority of the House, Democrats would
have needed to sweep all of the districts where they maintained even a
slight majority as well as all 9 of the “toss-up” districts with contested
races, most of which had Republican incumbents and historically “leaned”
Republican.
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The Democrats did not fare well in the Senate races either, although
this appears to be resultant of gerrymandering rather than underperformance. To obtain a bare majority, Democrats were required to sweep
all Democratic districts and all “toss-up” districts, which is impossible to do
in a single year due to the staggered elections in the Senate. There were
86. See JAMIN B. RASKIN, OVERRULING DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 234 (2004) (explaining that incumbents are advantaged not only by the
high cost of mounting campaigns but also by “self-subsidies in the form of press secretaries,
speechwriters, telephones, office space and so on . . . ”).
87. Candidate Listing for 2008 General Election, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE, DIV. OF
ELECTIONS, http://election/dos.state.fl.us/candidate/CanList.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
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only 12 Senate races, with the Democrats winning 4.88 Six of the districts
were historically “safe” for Republicans. Democrats did not gain any
additional seats in the Senate, leaving them with only 14 members, a mere
35% of the Senate.
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A review of the Florida Senate district map, infra, from 2008 reveals
Senate districts that clearly fail the test of compactness, especially in highly
populated areas such as the Tampa Bay region, Orlando, Jacksonville, and
Southeast Florida. In Tampa Bay, Democrats are packed into District 18,
which is crescent moon shaped and encompasses parts of four counties
holding a registered Democratic voter advantage of 110,000; the remaining
surrounding districts, 10, 13, 16, and 21 are Republican held and have a
combined registered Republican advantage of 52,000 voters.89
In the Orlando region, District 19, where Democrats hold a 3-to-1
registered voter advantage totaling 87,000 voters, is wrapped around a
bubble protruding from District 9, which holds a 5,000 voter Republican
majority.90 In Southeast Florida, a Democratic stronghold, Districts 36, 38,
and 40 are carved out to have a combined advantage of 74,000 registered
Republican voters; Districts 33, 34, and 35, which adjoin and surround
these Republican districts, have a combined Democratic voter advantage of
88.
89.

Id.
FLA. DEP’T OF STATE, DIV. OF ELECTIONS, COUNTY VOTER REGISTRATION BY
SENATE DISTRICT (Oct. 6, 2008), available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voterregistration/statistics/pdf/2008/2008genSenateDist.pdf.
90. Id.
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244,000.91 The shapes of these districts result in an 8-district swing in the
Republican Party’s favor due to the discriminatory packing and cracking of
Democrats in these regions.
2008 Florida Senate District Map

The above map applied to Florida Senate districts from 2002 onward,
skewing the majority of seats in favor of the Republican Party, but it is
most glaring in years such as 2008 when absent the gerrymander,
Democrats would have a very strong opportunity to reclaim control of the
Florida Senate based on the overall voter registration and voting patterns in
Florida.

91.

Id.
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C. Extinguished Political Influence

One aspect of Bandemer that Justice Scalia relied on in striking down
the justiciability of purely political gerrymandering, that a party’s indirect
influence on political discourse otherwise negates political discrimination,
fails to take into account political realities and should be remedied in
applying Bandemer or its successor to the blueprint laid out by Florida’s
current situation. Democrats have not faced voter suppression in the
traditional sense whereby they are precluded access to the polls, directly
violating the Equal Protection Clause.92 However, Bandemer provides:
[A]s in individual district cases, an equal protection violation may be
found only where the electoral system substantially disadvantages
certain voters in their opportunity to influence the political process
effectively. In this context, such a finding of unconstitutionality must be
supported by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority
of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance
to influence the political process.93

Justice Powell’s concurrence in Bandemer derided the plurality’s
assertion that a loss is “constitutionally insignificant as long as the losers
are not ‘entirely ignored’ by the winners.”94 He went on to note:
[T]he facts that the legislature permitted each Democratic voter to cast
his or her one vote, erected no barriers to the Democratic voters’
exercise of the franchise, and drew districts of equal population, are
irrelevant to a claim that district lines were drawn for the purpose and
with the effect of substantially debasing the strength of votes cast by
Democrats as a group.95

Justice Powell’s concurrence is illuminating, as the mere presence of
any Democrats in the state legislature would preclude allegations of
violations of the Equal Protection Clause by Justice Scalia’s reasoning.
Total dominance by a party via 100% membership control in a legislative
body is the only thing that could apparently overcome this “indirect
influence” requirement.
92. See Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1339 (2002) (stating that the mere
fact of being outvoted “‘provides no basis for invoking constitutional remedies
where . . . there is no indication that [the] segment of the population is being denied access
to the political system’” (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 154–55 (1971))).
93. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986).
94. Id. at 170 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95. Id. at 171.
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However, being “entirely ignored” is not beyond the pale in the event
that a single party holds a supermajority in both state chambers. State
representatives are not solely “in the business of providing constituents with
government services, such as fire and police protection, schools, utilities,
and road improvements,”96 and limiting the courts’ view to this aspect of
the legislature’s job constricts the nature of issues to be considered. There
are vast differences in policy outlook regarding the larger issues tackled by
state legislatures, including creating environmental and transportation
policy, providing funding for schools and higher education, regulating
welfare and food stamp distribution, and countless other issues.
Likewise, the effects of gerrymandering are not limited to in-state
issues in suppressing a minority party’s political will. Recently, several
states have floated the proposal of changing the Electoral College from a
winner-take-all proposition to awarding votes according to the
congressional districts won in each state.97 The effect in Florida on
National elections would have been significant; Al Gore would have
defeated President Bush in the 2000 presidential election. If the proposition
were carried to several states, President Obama could have lost in 2008 and
2012 despite holding a significant advantage in the popular vote in both
elections.98
The effect in Florida of Republicans holding a supermajority in both
houses is that Democrats are unable to pass any policy initiative based on
the Democratic platform or block any Republican policy initiative that they
vehemently disagree with.99 The only matters that Democrats may be able
96. Martinez, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 1339–40.
97. See Nia-Malika Henderson & Errin Haines, Republicans in Virginia, Other States
Seeking Electoral College Changes, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2013), http://articles.
washingtonpost.com/2013-01-24/politics/36528394_1_electoral-votes-votes-by-congression
al-district-electoral-college (naming Virginia, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania among
those proposing the changes).
98. See Micah Cohen, Electoral College Changes Would Pose Danger for Democrats,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 25, 2013, 8:47PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01
/25/electoral-college-changes-would-pose-danger-for-democrats/?_r=0 (claiming that if
Virginia, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Florida assigned electoral votes by
congressional district, Obama would have lost the 2012 election).
99. See Janet Zink, Gov. Rick Scott Rejects Funding for High-Speed Rail, TAMPA BAY
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2011 (rejecting $2.4 billion in federal funding to build high-speed rail line
between Tampa and Orlando); Alvarez, Lizette, Florida Higher Education May Face Big
Budget Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012, at A12 (trimming $300 million from higher
education budget); Mark Memmott, Drug Tests for Welfare Recipients, State Workers
Ignites Debate in Florida, NPR (June 2, 2011, 10:14AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
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to effect are those that have little to no effect on the state as a whole. The
supermajority would even permit veto override if the governor were a
Democrat, further overriding the will of a majority of the registered voting
populace.
D. The Template to Apply Bandemer to Party Claims of Purely Political
Gerrymandering
The above clearly denotes a template for use in claims of purely
political gerrymandering, yet will generally require a decade of delay prior
to bringing a suit based on alleged violations of the Equal Protection
Clause. The time required to show that there has been a violation would
encompass two reapportionment periods, or approximately ten years, so as
to show a pattern of discrimination and an inability to overcome such.
The above factors are patently present in Florida denoting purely
political gerrymandering with a discriminatory effect on the Democratic
Party, but it is still questionable whether the courts will deign to intervene.
As noted, supra, Florida’s electorate consists of 22% of registered voters
not affiliated with any party or who are registered Independents.100 The
Martinez court’s holding can be read to infer that a court can never interfere
in the event of purely political gerrymandering cases because electoral
losses are not the result of gerrymandering, dilution of voting power, or
violations of equal protection, but rather the failure of the losing party to
register sufficient voters, campaign well, and turn out voters well enough to
win. 101
way/2011/06/02/136884455/drug-tests-for-welfare-recipients-state-workers-ignites-debatein-florida (requiring drug testing of welfare recipients and new state government hires);
Arthur Delaney, Florida Unemployment Regime Violates Civil Rights: Labor Department,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/25/floridaunemployment-civil-rights_n_3154409.html?utm_hp_ref=rick-scott (requiring literacy and
math tests prior to receiving unemployment benefits regardless of language abilities).
100. COUNTY VOTER REGISTRATION 2012, supra note 11. There are a number of
smaller parties registered in Florida, but the parties are so small and have so few registered
voters as to render them statistically insignificant for the purposes herein.
101. See Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1340 (2002). The court stated that
even if a political majority could prove:
[A] history of disproportionate results in conjunction with some other
evidence in the totality of the circumstances of unconstitutional vote dilution,
no group will be able to prove a lack of ability to participate in the political
process. Any such claim will necessarily be refuted by the logical inference
to be drawn from a disparity between voting age population and registered
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It could be argued that the Martinez reasoning may be theoretically
sound but is certainly not applicable to real-world scenarios. A court
viewing such issues rationally and through the prism of real-world
experiences will not simply toss aside such claims as inactionable. Rather,
one hopes that a court considering a claim that purely political
gerrymandering results in equal protection violations will recognize that
even in a state with a high percentage of registered voters not affiliated with
party politics, gerrymandering can make it statistically improbable for the
party discriminated against to achieve electoral victory, regardless of their
voter registration and get-out-the-vote efforts. By example, for Democrats
to succeed in Congressional districts controlled by Republicans, they would
need to achieve landslide victories among NPA voters by receiving in
excess of 66% of their votes and much higher in many districts.
IV. What Can Be Done About Gerrymandering?
It is not likely that the courts will take up the issue of purely political
gerrymandering in the near future or take action given the current makeup
of the Supreme Court. Florida voters have taken an excellent first step in
addressing the issue by passing amendments to the state constitution, supra,
but the result has yet to be fully determined as the court cases addressing
them are still in their early stages. Should judicial enforcement of the
constitutional amendments fail, it is incumbent on the Florida Legislature or
voters to take additional steps to rectify the situation.102 Creating a truly
voters or between registered voters and voter turnout. . . . A failure to do
these things will be the actual cause of any inability on the group’s part to
elect the candidates of its choice and have those candidates represent its
interests.
Id. The rejection of minority views by the majority party cannot raise constitutional
concerns:
To hold otherwise would be tantamount to holding that ‘it is invidiously
discriminatory for a [political subdivision] to elect its delegation by a
majority vote based on party or candidate platforms and so to some extent
predetermine legislative votes on particular issues.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 155 (1971)).
102. See Martin Dyckman, Rejected Redistricting Reform of 1993 Haunts Legislature,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Mar. 24, 2002), http://www.sptimes.com/2002/03/24/Columns/
Rejected_redistrictin.shtml (describing previous failed attempts to amend the Florida
constitution). Several efforts were made in 1978, 1993 and 1998 to create a judicial or nonpartisan redistricting commission. Id. The 1978 ballot initiative lost at the polls, while the
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non-partisan redistricting commission will be the most effective way to
create fairness in the electoral process and it will be the easiest method to
communicate to the electorate.
A. Florida’s Constitutional Amendment
As noted, supra, Florida’s 2010 constitutional amendments, in theory,
will preclude political considerations in the redistricting process. In
applying to both congressional and state legislative redistricting, the state
constitution now provides that “[n]o apportionment plan or district shall be
drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent;
and districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or
abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to
participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect
representatives of their choice . . . .”103 Although the amendments were
initially challenged on federal constitutional grounds, they have been
upheld by the Florida Supreme Court as “entirely consistent with the
Elections Clause, both as to its substance and matter of enactment.”104
In adopting these provisions, the Florida Constitution places more
stringent requirements on the redistricting process than does the United
States Constitution.105 Additionally, the Florida Supreme Court recognized
the “critical importance of redistricting in ensuring the basic rights of the
citizens to vote for the representatives of their choice” and that the new
constraints were intended to “’maximize electoral possibilities by leveling
the playing field’ for the increased protection of the rights of Florida’s
citizens . . . .”106 By enacting these amendments, the Florida judiciary’s
role has been expanded in analyzing the level of compliance the legislature
meets in preventing partisan influence in redrawing the district maps.107
However, the new Florida law differs from the analysis of the federal courts
1993 and 1998 efforts were killed in the legislature due to incumbency concerns. Id.
103. FLA. CONST. art. III § 20 (2010).
104. Brown v. Sec’y of State of Fla., 668 F.3d 1271, 1285 (11th Cir. 2012).
105. See In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d
597, 598–99 (Fla. 2012) (“With the advent of the Fair Districts Amendment, the Florida
Constitution now imposes more stringent requirements as to apportionment than the United
States Constitution and prior versions of the state constitution.”).
106. Id. at 604–05 (quoting Brown, 668 F.3d at 1285).
107. See id. at 607 (“[T]he parameters of the Legislature’s responsibilities under the
Florida Constitution, and therefore this Court’s scope of review, have plainly increased,
requiring a commensurately more expanded judicial analysis of legislative compliance.”).
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under the Equal Protection Clause as provided under Vieth, which looks to
when partisan districting “‘has gone too far,’” but prohibits wholesale
partisan intent from the “apportionment plan as a whole and to each district
individually.”108
Following passage of these amendments, the 2012 redistricting process
was conducted by a Republican-dominated legislature with the apparent
assistance of Republican Party consultants. As a result, the League of
Women Voters, Common Cause, and a number of individual plaintiffs filed
lawsuits, now consolidated at the appellate levels, challenging the new
districts.109 The first of these cases was filed in February, 2012, and they
are still in the trial discovery phase as the legislature claimed that their
deliberations in the redistricting process were privileged. The legislature
refused to disclose draft maps and documents related to redistricting, and
they refused to produce legislators and staff for depositions.
The Supreme Court of Florida heard oral argument on this issue on
September 16, 2013. In its opinion, the Court recognized for the first time
the existence of legislative privilege in Florida, but held that it was not
absolute, as there is a broad constitutional right to access of public records
and transparency in the legislative process.110 This legislative privilege
may yield to a compelling, competing interest111 and that “[p]artisan
political shenanigans are not ‘state secrets.’”112 To that end, the Court again
recognizes that the constitutional amendments “mandate prohibiting
improper partisan or discriminatory intent in redistrict” and “therefore
quires that discovery e permitted to determine whether the Legislature has
engage in actions designed to circumvent the constitutional mandate.”
The Florida Supreme Court’s ruling in this matter is a victory for the
challengers to the 2012 redistricting, and it appears that it will result in the
transparency sought by the amendments and recognized by the courts.
Although the case now continues unabated in the discovery process, a final
108.
109.

Id. at 616–17 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 296 (2004)).
See Justin Levitt, Litigation in the 2010 Cycle: Florida, ALL ABOUT
REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/cases-FL/php#FL (last visited Oct. 22, 2013)
(listing current Florida redistricting cases).
110. The League of Women Voters, et al. v. Florida House of Representatives, No.
SC13-949; Romo, et al. v. Florida House of Representatives, No. SC13-951, 2013 WL
6570903, at *1, *9 (Dec. 13, 2013).
111. Id. at *9.
112. Id. at *6, citing Romo v. Florida House of Representatives 113 So. 3d 117 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2013) (Benton, C.J., dissenting).

338

20 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 297 (2014)

determination on the concrete impact of the amendments on the Florida
redistricting process will not likely be reached before 2015 due to the
probable lengthy appellate process.
Should the Florida courts enforce the amendment with the
exactingness dictated by precedent, it must “construe [the] constitutional
provision[s] consistent with the intent of the framers and the voters”
examine “the evil sought to be remedied, and the circumstances leading to
its inclusion” in the constitution “in light of the historical development” of
the law at the time of its adoption.113 Per the Florida Supreme Court’s
prior ruling in In re. . . Legislative Apportionment, all redistricting efforts
must be devoid of political intent:
[T]here is no acceptable level of improper intent. It does not reference
the word “invidious” as the term has been used by the United States
Supreme Court in equal protection discrimination cases, and Florida's
provision should not be read to require a showing of malevolent or evil
purpose. Moreover, by its express terms, Florida's constitutional
provision prohibits intent, not effect, and applies to both the
apportionment plan as a whole and to each district individually.114

Accordingly, in theory, the outcome of these court challenges would
require the legislature to refrain from contemplating political outcomes
when conducting redistricting. However, if this proves unavoidably
difficult, it is feasible that the legislature sua sponte divests itself of its
redistricting powers to create a truly bipartisan or non-partisan commission
to undertake the decennial reapportionment within the legislature.
B. Creation of a Non-Partisan State Electoral Commission
A number of states currently use a non-partisan commission to conduct
their decennial redistricting.115 Other options, such as multi-member
113. In re Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 614 (Fla. 2012) (quoting
Zingale v. Powell, 885 So. 2d 277, 282 (Fla. 2004); In re Apportionment Law Appearing as
Senate Joint Resolution 1 E, 1982 Special Apportionment Session; Constitutionality Vel
Non, 414 So. 2d 1040, 1048 (Fla. 1982); Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1357 (Fla. 1980).
114. In re Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d at 617 (internal citations
omitted).
115. See State by State Redistricting Procedures, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.
org/wiki/index.php/State-by-state_redistricting_procedures (last modified Aug. 27, 2013)
(listing fourteen states that provide for non-legislative/bipartisan redistricting committees:
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Missouri, Montana,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Washington).
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districts, instant run-offs and proportional representation via preferential
voting are other options, but will require significant efforts to educate the
public on their mechanisms.
The non-partisan commission may be combined with a “top two open
primary” system whereby all candidates are put on the same ballot
regardless of party affiliation, and the two candidates receiving the most
primary votes will run in the general election.116 This method was recently
effectuated in California with great success in restoring competitiveness in
races and proportionality to the legislative makeup of its Congressional
Delegation.117 A number of other states have codified in their state
constitutions and statutes that partisanship be removed from the
redistricting process with similar results.118
This proposed method may not ultimately work to return proportional
representation to the electoral process as many Florida Democrats selflocate in metropolitan areas such as South Florida, Tampa Bay, Orlando,
and Jacksonville, resulting in vast geographical areas where they do not
maintain a majority.119 However, the first step must be taken to prevent
further distortion of Florida’s and the nation’s political landscape and wellbeing. As it is unlikely that any majority party will freely abdicate power,
Florida Democrats would do well to take a two-pronged approach in
rectifying gerrymandering in the state. First, they should file an action
laying out the discriminatory effects of political gerrymandering since 2002
in hopes that a court would not immediately dismiss it as a non-justiciable
question. Second, they must continue efforts to obtain a state constitutional
amendment via a ballot initiative should the current iterations of the
amendments prohibiting political considerations be utilized in redistricting
116. Congressional & Presidential Primaries: Open, Closed, Semi-Closed and “Top
Two”, FAIRVOTE.ORG, http://www.fairvote.org/congressional-and-presidential-primariesopen-closed-semi-closed-and-top-two#.UXcDGL_3DoA (last updated May 2012).
117. See CAL. CONST. art. XXI §§ 1–3 (directing the creation of a 14-member “Citizens
Redistricting Commission”); see also Wang, supra note 8 (noting that California Democrats
received 62% of the votes cast for the House of Representatives and won 38 of 53 seats,
exactly matching computer models forecasting the delegation makeup by vote proportion).
118. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §72-1506; IOWA CODE ANN. §42.4; MONT. CODE ANN. §51-115; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §188.010(2); WASH. CONST. art. II §43(5).
119. See Chris Christoff & Greg Giroux, Republicans Foil What Majority Wants by
Gerrymandering, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar. 18, 2013, 12:00AM), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2013-03-18/republicans-foil-what-most-u-s-wants-with-gerrymandering.html
(noting that in the 2008 election, Obama received more than half of his Florida votes from
just six of the state’s 67 counties).
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not be strictly upheld. The constitutional amendment should create a
bipartisan commission to establish representational districts, thus taking the
decennial reapportionment out of the hands of the legislature.
V. Conclusion
Despite the clear evidence of gerrymandering in Florida through two
censuses, disaffected Florida voters will not likely obtain a reprieve from
the federal courts in this decade and thus have acted accordingly by
overwhelmingly passing and seeking the enforcement of the above
discussed constitutional amendments.
If the Florida constitutional
amendments are ultimately enforced in accord with the plain meaning of
their language, the results could force the legislature to recuse itself from
the redistricting process and create a non-partisan commission.
Although the highest concentrations of Democratic voters lie in
metropolitan areas such as South Florida, Tampa Bay, Orlando, and
Jacksonville, they maintain a majority of registered voters in 41-of-67
Florida counties and a non-partisan redistricting plan would likely bring the
state and legislative delegations toward an equilibrium more reflective of
the partisan make-up of the state. Such a non-partisan redistricting plan may
not be the final cure-all to ease Florida’s proportionally unrepresentative
electoral woes due to the vagaries of off-year elections, voter motivation,
and the ever-present NPA voter, but it would certainly be a good first step
toward restoring fair and proportionate representation at the state legislative
and Congressional levels.

